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Sammendrag:. For å sikre at internasjonale avtaler 
overholdes, er det viktig å kunne iverksette 
straffetiltak mot eventuelle land som ikke overholder 
sine forpliktelser. Det er imidlertid rimelig å kreve at 
slike tiltak ikke har betydelige negative virkninger 
også for andre land. Kyoto-protokollens 
håndhevingsmekanisme tilfredsstiller ikke dette 
kravet. Straffetiltakene som spesifiseres i Marrakesh-
avtalen, vil ikke bare bli kostbare for land som bryter 
sine forpliktelser. Også land som overholder avtalen 
vil bli utsatt for betydelige negative velferdseffekter. 
Ved hjelp av en numerisk modell viser vi at for Norge 
kan velferdseffektene til og med bli verre når et annet 
land (for eksempel Canada, Japan eller Russland) blir 
straffet enn om Norge selv blir straffet. Også andre 
land som blir kjøpere i kvotemarkedet vil være utsatt 
for lignende effekter. Norge rammes imidlertid 
hardere enn andre kjøperland fordi Norge også er en 
stor eksportør av olje og gass. 
   
Abstract: To induce compliance, an international 
enforcement mechanism needs to authorize the use of 
punitive consequences against a non-compliant 
country. However, it is reasonable to require that such 
consequences do not cause considerable damage to 
other countries as well. The compliance mechanism of 
the Kyoto Protocol does not meet this requirement. 
The Marrakesh Accords instruct the Enforcement 
Branch of the Compliance Committee to impose 
punitive consequences on a country that fails to fulfill 
its commitments. These consequences will not only be 
costly to the non-compliant country. They will have 
considerable adverse welfare effects for compliant 
countries too. Using a numerical model, we show that 
in the case of Norway, the welfare effects can actually 
be worse if another country (such as Canada, Japan or 
Russia) is punished than if Norway itself is punished. 
Similar effects will also be experienced by other 
buyers of emission permits. But Norway suffers more 
than other buyers because it is also a major exporter of 
fossil fuels. 
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1 Introduction 
The Kyoto Protocol provides specific targets for reducing emissions of greenhouse gases in 
the so-called Annex I (i.e., industrialized) countries.1 These targets are supposed to be met in 
the first commitment period, which begins in 2008 and ends in 2012. However, in some 
countries current emissions are significantly higher than their Kyoto targets.2 Thus, there is a 
real possibility that not all parties are going to live up to their obligations for the first 
commitment period. 
The Marrakesh Accords – a follow-up to the Kyoto Protocol – provides details for a 
compliance mechanism for the international climate regime. In particular, it establishes a 
Compliance Committee with both a Facilitative Branch and an Enforcement Branch. The 
Facilitative Branch shall provide ‘advice and facilitation to Parties in implementing the 
Protocol’, whereas the Enforcement Branch shall determine whether a party is in non-
compliance with its emission target, its reporting requirements, and the eligibility 
requirements for participation in the flexibility mechanisms.3 The Accords also specify a list 
of punitive consequences to be imposed by the Enforcement Branch in the second 
commitment period (2013-2017) on countries that fail to comply in the first period. These 
consequences are (i) deduction from the party’s allowance for the second commitment period 
of 1.3 times the amount of excess emissions in the first period, (ii) development of a 
compliance action plan, and (iii) suspension of the eligibility to sell permits under the 
emissions trading provisions until that right is reinstated.  
Views differ considerably regarding the potency of this compliance mechanism. Some 
authors see it as “unique to international law” (Werksman, forthcoming: 4), pointing out that 
“the Protocol System seems to be the only one in international law to apply consequences of a 
penal character” (Ulfstein & Werksman, forthcoming:19). By contrast, one critic argues that 
the compliance mechanism is “obviously flawed”, and that it offers little if any incentive for 
compliance (Barrett 2002, 2003:383-386). Barrett lists a number of objections to the 
compliance mechanism. First, if a country which is found by the Enforcement Branch to be in 
non-compliance in the first commitment period fails to comply in the second period as well, 
then it must presumably make up for the difference (plus 30 percent) in the third period. 
However, this implies that the punishment might be forever delayed. Obviously, a punishment 
that can be forever delayed is a weak deterrent. Second, the anticipation of being punished is 
likely to induce countries to hold out for a generous allowance in the upcoming negotiations 
for second period emission targets. If successful, this would reduce the de facto punishment. 
Third, the Marrakesh Accords include no enforcement provisions addressing failure by a non-
compliant country to accept the punishment. Hence, the compliance mechanism depends on 
active cooperation by the non-compliant party. Fourth, any party is entitled to withdraw from 
the Kyoto protocol giving 12 months’ notice. It follows that a country that is being punished 
might evade the punishment simply by withdrawing from the Kyoto Protocol. Finally, the 
compliance mechanism is not legally binding, and can be made so only through an 
amendment which requires a three-fourths majority vote of the Meeting of the Parties. And 
even if the amendment obtains an affirmative vote, the compliance mechanism becomes 
binding only on those countries that choose to ratify the amendment. 
1 The fate of the Kyoto Protocol remains uncertain, pending Russia’s decision of whether to ratify.  
2 For example, in 2003 Norwegian emissions were 8 percent higher than in 1990, while Norway’s 
Kyoto target allows emissions to be only 1 percent higher than in 1990. 
3 The flexibility mechanisms are (i) emissions trading, (ii) joint implementation and (iii) the clean 
development mechanism. 
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The compliance mechanism also suffers from an additional problem. Even though the 
Marrakesh Accords state unambiguously that (all of) the punitive consequences shall be 
imposed if a country is found not to be in compliance, it is far from obvious that a non-
compliant country actually will be punished. The reason is that “determining whether or not a 
country is non-compliant requires judgment and discretion” (Hagem et al., forthcoming, see 
also Hagem & Westskog, forthcoming, Rypdal 2003, and Ulfstein and Werksman, 
forthcoming). Moreover, if punitive consequences are imposed on a non-compliant country, 
other countries will also suffer adverse welfare effects.4 This creates incentives for strategic 
behaviour in the Enforcement Branch. If at least some members of the enforcement branch 
take these effects into consideration, a country that is technically in non-compliance might be 
able to escape punishment (Hagem et al., forthcoming). 
While the above-mentioned weaknesses might undermine the ability of the compliance 
mechanism to function as intended, its strength will not be definitively tested until the regime 
has been in full operation for some time (i.e, not until the second commitment period). In the 
meantime it is of considerable interest to ask what the effects are likely to be if some countries 
fail to fulfill their Kyoto targets and must face punitive consequences as a result of this. 
Focusing on one minor Annex I country, Norway, this is what we do in this paper. As we 
shall see, Norway is particularly interesting in this context, because of its combined role a 
major exporter of fossil fuels and a likely buyer of emission permits (due to high abatement 
costs).  
Using a numerical model, we estimate the welfare effects for Norway if Norway fails to 
comply. Similarly, we estimate welfare effects for Norway if certain other countries – 
Canada, Japan, Russia – fail to comply. The latter countries are among the most important 
remaining Annex I parties after the US decided not to ratify Kyoto. We show that imposing 
punitive consequences on any one of these other countries can entail considerable costs for 
Norway as well, even when Norway itself is in compliance. In fact, the effect of punitive 
consequences being imposed on one of these other countries (assuming that Norway is in 
compliance) can be greater than the corresponding effect of punitive consequences being 
imposed on Norway itself for noncompliance (while other countries are in compliance). This 
is true as long as the relative degree of non-compliance is the same in either case (in each of 
our scenarios one country exceeds its allowance in the first commitment period by three 
percent). 
That punishing a non-compliant country can entail considerable costs for complying 
countries is likely to pose a legitimacy problem for the Enforcement Branch. The standards of 
due process require that parties are treated in accordance with existing notions of fairness and 
justice (Ulfstein & Werksman, forthcoming:3). To suffer because another country is punished 
does not seem easily compatible with such notions. It hardly makes things better that the costs 
of punishment are very unevenly distributed. For example, if a large seller of emissions 
permits (such as Russia) faces punitive consequences, other sellers (such as Hungary) benefit 
from a higher permit price. By contrast, buyers (such as Norway) suffer significantly. In other 
words, a disproportionate share of the external costs following from the imposition of 
punitive consequences will be borne by buyers of emissions permits. Norway suffers even 
more than other buyers because it is also a major exporter of fossil fuels. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the welfare effects 
which are assumed to follow from the imposition of punitive consequences against a non-
compliant country. We begin with an overview of general effects on prices, demand and 
supply, and then focus on the effects for particular categories of countries. Section 3 describes 
the model and presents and explains the main results. As we shall see, the results are highly 
4 These effects are discussed in detail in section 3. 
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intuitive in light of the background provided in section 2. Finally, section 4 rounds up the 
paper with some concluding remarks.    
2 Welfare effects of punitive consequences 
We first discuss some general economic effects that occur if the Enforcement Branch imposes 
punitive consequences on a non-compliant country – given the assumptions underlying the 
numerical model used in this paper. We assume that the Annex I countries will meet their 
Kyoto Protocol emission reduction commitments primarily through the use of emission 
trading. In general we assume perfectly competitive markets and include taxes and tariffs, but 
do not take into account market power in either the emission permit market or fossil fuel 
markets. Furthermore, in our model we will only concern ourselves with the reduction of CO2 
emissions.  The assumptions on which the model is based are discussed in greater detail in the 
appendix. The purpose of this section is to provide some background which is needed in order 
to understand the subsequent discussion of effects for particular countries under specific 
scenarios.  
2.1 General effects 
When a non-compliant country faces punitive consequences, this has a number of economic 
effects. Some of these effects apply only to the country that is being punished. Others apply to 
all parties to the protocol and even to non-parties. The general effects are summarised in table 
1.  
The imposition of punitive consequences will cause the price of emission permits to 
increase. There are two reasons for this. First, the reduction in the punished country’s 
allowance means that the combined emission target for the countries trading in the 
international market for emission permits becomes more stringent.5 This boosts the demand 
for permits. And second, suspension of the punished country’s right to sell permits reduces 
the supply of permits on the international market. Both effects tend to drive the price of 
permits upwards. This price increase is the primary driver of the welfare effects caused by 
punishment. Note, however, that the price increase for permits pertains to the international 
market. For a country that is a permit seller, the suspension of the right to trade decouples its 
domestic permit market from the international market. The domestic price of emission 
permits will therefore in general drop below the international price.6 Nevertheless, it remains 
true that the price of emission permits will increase on the international market. 
CO2 emissions can be reduced through carbon sequestration, increased energy efficiency or 
reduction in the consumption of fossil fuels. The Kyoto Protocol imposes limits on the use of 
carbon sequestration as a mitigation option. In addition, the scope for improved energy 
efficiency is limited, at least in the short-run. Part of the emission reduction will therefore 
have to be achieved by reducing the use of fossil fuels (in our model this turns out to be a 
large share of the reductions). Different fossil fuels have different carbon content. Intuitively, 
one might expect that when overall emissions must be reduced, this will result in substitution 
of relatively carbon-lean oil and gas for more carbon-intensive coal. The nature of the 
5 Because of the 30% penalty, the global emission ceiling is always reduced when a country is 
punished. If the punished country is a seller of permits, there will also be fewer permits available in the 
market.  
6 Note that if the domestic price would have been higher than the international price, the country is free 
to and also would choose to purchase permits on the international market.  
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substitution effects depends on the market structure in the various markets for fossil fuels, 
physical and institutional constraints, and the substitutability between different fuels.  
An increased permit price will make it more costly to consume fossil fuels. Hence, the 
overall demand for fossil fuels will decrease in Annex І countries. At the same time, the 
demand for fossil fuel intensive goods can also decrease as the increased energy prices raise 
the price, implying that the demand for other goods can increase (because of substitution 
effects). A change in the permit price therefore has an impact on the price and production 
(quantity) of fossil fuels, of fossil fuel intensive goods, and indeed of all other goods (in 
decreasing order of sensitivity to changes in the permit price). For a broader discussion of 
such terms-of-trade effects, see for example Babiker et al. (2000).  
By itself, this means that fossil fuel exporting countries experience a loss of revenue as the 
permit price increases, while countries importing fossil fuels gain from the decreased price of 
fossil fuels.7 This can also hold true for fossil fuel intensive goods (however, as other inputs 
in the production of fossil fuel intensive goods might become cheaper, the effect is not always 
straightforward).  
Table 1: General economic effects of punitive consequences 
Market Emission permits Fossil fuels Fossil fuel intensive goods 
Effects • Price increases  • Consumer price increases 
• Overall demand decreases 
•  Possible fuel-switching 
• Consumer price might increase 
• Demand might decrease. 
 
2.2 Welfare effects for individual countries 
Largely, the general effects discussed so far take place independently of whether we are 
looking at compliant or non-compliant countries and whether the country being punished is a 
permit seller or a permit buyer. We now turn to the effects experienced by particular 
categories of countries. 
As we have seen, punishment invariably results in a higher permit price. In turn, this price 
increase entails higher costs of meeting the emission targets.8 This applies to all countries that 
are permit buyers. This cost increase will be particularly high for a permit buying country that 
is punished, as the country then also has to buy additional permits. Imposition of punitive 
consequences allows countries that are permit sellers to obtain a higher price in the 
international market for permits.9 But for a permit seller that is being punished the welfare 
loss can be very large, as all revenue from permit sales is lost. While such a country will 
always experience a welfare loss, it can be difficult to predict the economic effects in specific 
markets, especially if the domestic price for emission permits drops below the international 
7 This assumes that OPEC does not maintain oil prices by restraining production, in which case the 
OPEC countries would bear the greater share of the welfare losses, and the losses of other oil exporting 
countries would be reduced. See Berg et al. (1997) for a discussion of these effects.  
8 The cost of meeting emission targets will increase irrespective of whether the country buys emission 
permits at the increased price, or increases domestic abatement efforts.  
9 While the overall demand for permits might decrease, this is not enough to offset the effect of a 
higher permit price, and the result is increased revenue from permit sales.  
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price.10 This is because the punished country then faces a situation where the domestic permit 
price is lower than it would otherwise have been. Thus, the overall domestic demand for fossil 
fuels (and possibly also the demand for fossil fuel intensive goods) will increase. At the same 
time, however, the demand for fossil fuels decreases in the rest of the world. What then 
happens to fossil fuel prices in the punished country depends on factors such as the extent to 
which that country is linked to international markets for fossil fuels, whether it is an exporter 
or importer in those markets, substitutability between fuels, substitutability of fuels imported 
from different sources, and taxation of fossil fuels. Furthermore, because it at the same time 
becomes more costly for other countries to reach their emission targets, the country’s fossil 
fuel intensive industries will become more competitive internationally.11 An increase in 
exports from these sectors would entail an increase in the demand for fossil fuels within the 
country that is being punished.  
The welfare effects for individual countries are summarised in table 2. Note that the table 
does not include welfare effects caused by changes in fossil fuel markets.  
 
Table 2:  Welfare effects for individual countries by characteristics of the 
country 
 Permit seller Permit buyer 
Non-compliant Welfare loss due to loss of permit 
sales revenue.  
Welfare loss due to more stringent 
allowance and higher permit price 
Compliant Welfare gain due to increased 
revenue from permit sales. 
Welfare loss due to increased 
permit price 
 
3  Results 
3.1 The DEEP model 
The DEEP model is a multi-sector and multi-region intertemporal computable general 
equilibrium model. The sectors and regions used in this paper are listed in table 3.12 Details of 
the model are given in appendix 1, while a full description of the DEEP model, including 
assumptions on elasticities and the dynamics of the model, can be found in Kallbekken 
(2004).  
For this analysis, the model is run for five periods at five-year intervals (1997-2021). The 
year 2012 is taken to represent the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, while the 
year 2017 represents the second commitment period. We assume that the absolute emission 
targets (i.e. Kyoto targets) remain the same for the two periods, and only CO2 emissions.  
10 If a country with excess emission permits  is punished, the domestic permit price might even fall to 
zero. 
11 Carbon leakage refers to a situation where a difference in permit prices gives incentives to shift 
energy intensive activities to countries with the lowest permit price (in this case the country being 
punished). 
12 Note that while we are interested in the effects of punishment to individual countries, the model 
requires some aggregation of countries into larger regions. Sometimes we will therefore deal with 
regions, such as “Rest of Annex B”, rather than individual countries.  
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In the baseline scenario all parties to the Protocol fulfil their emission reduction 
commitments (the US is assumed not to join in either period). The Kyoto Protocol is 
implemented through a fully competitive emissions trading market, but without the Clean 
Development Mechanism or Joint Implementation.  
There are five non-compliance scenarios. In each scenario a country exceeds its allowance 
in the first commitment period by 3%, and is then punished for this non-compliance in the 
second commitment period.13,14  The punishment is a 3.9% reduction in its allowable 
emissions for the second period, and loss of the right to sell emissions permits to other 
countries.  
                                                     
The countries that are non-compliant in each of the five scenarios are Russia, Japan, 
Canada, Norway and Hungary. To avoid confusion we refer to the scenarios by country-codes 
and to the countries by their full name.  
The Kyoto Protocol allows banking of permits from one period to the next. It is efficient to 
bank permits if the (discounted) permit price is higher in the second period than in the first. If 
a country is punished for non-compliance, the permit price will increase in the second period. 
Thus, expectations that one or more countries are going to be punished make it efficient to 
bank more permits than if no punishment is expected. Expectations regarding non-compliance 
and punishment are therefore relevant for decisions about how many permits to bank. It is, 
however, difficult to predict exactly what kind of expectations are likely to prevail. One 
extreme is that any non-compliance comes as a complete surprise. The other extreme is that 
all cases of non-compliance (and punishment) are perfectly predicted. The most realistic 
situation is probably somewhere between these two extremes. We will, however, use the two 
extremes as possible banking alternatives. We call these two cases “surprise” and “foresight”.  
We ran all of the five non-compliance scenarios for each of the two cases. In the 
“foresight” case all countries make efficient banking decisions based on perfect foresight of 
punishment in the second period. In the “surprise” case all countries assume that there will be 
zero punishment in the second period when making decisions about banking. This implies the 
same level of banking as takes place in the baseline scenario.  
3.2 Results and discussion 
Our primary concern is the welfare effects of punishing a non-compliant country. Changes in 
welfare are measured as per cent change in equivalent variation for the entire model 
horizon.15  
13 We could have chosen to model a situation where countries exceed their allowance by an equal 
number of tonnes of CO2. This would, however, not be a very interesting situation as the change in the 
permit price, and all second order effects, would then be the same for all scenarios where permit buying 
countries are punished.  
14 The reader might object that if a region has incentives to be non-compliant in the first commitment 
period, then why do we assume that it will comply when it is being punished for this non-compliance? 
We get around this problem if we assume for example that firms/industries are responsible for the non-
compliance through underreporting of emissions, and that the government does not have a sufficiently 
good monitoring system to detect this in the first period. When this non-compliance is discovered, the 
monitoring system is improved, and the firms are not able to underreport their actual emissions in the 
second commitment period.  
15 This explains, to some extent, why the estimated welfare changes are relatively modest. If all 
changes could be attributed entirely to the final period, which is when the punishment takes place, the 
welfare changes for that period alone would be roughly five times greater than the numbers for the 
whole model horizon (with a zero change for all other periods).  
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However, in order to understand the welfare effects reported below, it is informative to 
look first at some key variables that affect welfare gains and losses from changes in the 
permit market. Table 4 shows some key numbers for permit trading in the second 
commitment period in the baseline scenario. We note that, in this model, Russia and Hungary 
are the only two sellers in the permit market, and Russia is by far the dominant seller.16 All 
other Annex I countries are permit buyers – relying on buying permits to cover around 18-
23% of their emissions.  
Table 3: Regional and sectoral aggregation 
Country code Country name  Sectors 
FSU Russia (Former Soviet Union 
countries) 
 Services and manufacturing 
JAP Japan  Petroleum and coal products (refined) 
CAN Canada  Crude oil 
NOR Norway*  Natural gas 
HUN Hungary  Coal 
RAB Rest of Annex B  Electricity 
USA United States of America  Investment good 
ASI Asia 
ALM Africa and Latin America 
* The GTAP region “Rest of EFTA” also includes Iceland and Liechtenstein.  Norway, however, 
accounts for 94% of both GDP and CO2 emissions in this region.  
 
Table 4: Total allowance, projected emissions and net permit sales17 
Country 
 
Total 
allowance 
(Mt C) 
Projected 
emissions 
(Mt C) 
Net permit 
sales 
(Mt C) 
Net permit sales 
(% of total allowance) 
Russia 99,82 70,77 29,05 29,1 % 
Japan 26,80 32,00 -5,20 -19,4 % 
Canada 11,48 14,16 -2,68 -23,3 % 
Norway 1,04 1,23 -0,18 -17,7 % 
Hungary 1,92 1,80 0,13 6,7 % 
Rest of Annex B 98,80 119,94 -21,14 -21,4 % 
 
To explain the welfare changes in the various scenarios it is also helpful to know what the 
permit price is in each scenario. Estimated permit prices for the second commitment period 
are shown in table 5. In the baseline scenario (where no country is punished) the permit price 
is $9.56. If Russia is punished, and this comes as a complete surprise, the permit price 
                                                     
16 Eastern European countries are expected to be permit sellers. In the model these countries are, 
however, part of the Rest of Annex B – which has a net demand for permits.  
17 The “total allowance” figures are the sum of the assumed second commitment period target plus 
permits banked from the first commitment period. 
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increases to a very high $59.41. In the “foresight” case, the permit price becomes $25.62 if 
Russia is punished. In all other non-compliance scenarios, and for both cases, the price 
increases by less than $1.  
Table 5: Second period permit prices (US$1997/ton C) under the different 
scenarios 
 Baseline FSU JAP CAN NOR HUN 
Surprise 9.56 59.41 10.29 9.87 9.59 9.65 
Foresight 9.56 25.62 9.95 9.73 9.58 9.61 
 
The welfare effects of punishing a non-compliant country are shown in table 6 for the 
“surprise” case, and in table 7 for the “foresight” case. Knowing the structure of permit 
trading, and the permit price in each scenario, the welfare effects become highly intuitive in 
every case. First, the country being punished suffers a welfare loss. Second, a permit seller 
that is punished generally experiences a greater welfare loss than a permit buyer that is 
punished. The reason is that permit sellers lose all revenue from permit sales in the second 
period. Third, and unsurprisingly, the welfare effects are greatest if Russia is punished. The 
explanation is that Russia is by far the largest permit seller, and thus if Russia is punished a 
large number of permits are withdrawn from the international market. As can be seen from 
tables 6 and 7, these results are valid for both cases (only the absolute size of the welfare 
effects differs). In general, the welfare changes are smaller in the “foresight” case than in the 
“surprise” case. The reason is that with perfect foresight it is possible to bank more permits 
for what would otherwise have been a more costly second period, and this represents an 
efficiency gain.  
Fifth, and more remarkably, several countries also experience significant welfare effects if 
other countries are being punished. All permit buyers suffer a welfare loss when another 
country is being punished. At the same time, permit sellers experience a welfare gain.18 In 
fact, some countries experience a heavier welfare loss if certain other countries are punished 
than if they are punished themselves. While in the “surprise” case Norway experiences a 
welfare loss of 0.006% if it is punished itself, it suffers a slightly larger loss if Canada is 
punished. More impressively, if Japan is punished, the welfare loss for Norway is 0.013% – 
more than twice the loss it suffers if Norway itself is punished. And if Russia is punished, 
Norway must endure a massive loss of 0.812%. This large loss, and the corresponding great 
increase in the permit price, can only partly be explained by the fact that Norway is a permit 
buyer; the cost to Norway of meeting its Kyoto commitment increases by USD 5 million if 
Norway is punished itself, and USD 525 million if Russia is punished. For the Rest of the 
Annex B region, which imports an even larger share of permits than Norway does (about 21% 
of total emissions), the welfare loss if Russia is punished is only 0.29%. The reason for 
Norway’s comparatively high welfare loss is that Norway is a large exporter of fossil fuels. 
When the permit price increases, the consumer price of fossil fuels also increases, while the 
producer price and demand decrease. In the case where Russia is punished, the producer price 
for crude oil decreases by 0.2%, and demand decreases by a significant 3.6%.19 This loss 
amounts to about USD 230 million. For the case where Norway itself is punished the model 
                                                     
18 Except in some cases where welfare effects are negligible (i.e. no changes observed in the six 
decimal points that the model can display).  
19 Table 4 shows that if Russian permit exports are taken off the market, the emission cap for the other 
Annex І countries in effect becomes 14% more stringent. This explains why the demand for crude oil 
should decrease by a large percentage. 
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does not register any losses (measured to within 0.1 million USD). The reason why the losses 
sum to more than the total welfare loss in table 7 is that welfare gains are not included.20  
Table 6: Percentage change in welfare (EV) and welfare loss in millions USD (in 
brackets). “Surprise” case compared to baseline scenario 
 Non-compliance scenario 
Country FSU JAP CAN NOR HUN 
Norway 
-0.812% 
(-299) 
-0.013% 
(-5) 
-0.006% 
(-2) 
-0.006% 
(-2) 
-0.001% 
(-1) 
Hungary 
1.331% 
(140) 
0.016% 
(2) 
0.007% 
(1) 
0.001% 
(0) 
-0.118% 
(-12) 
FSU 
-1.444% 
(-2467) 
0.096% 
(165) 
0.041% 
(70) 
0.004% 
(6) 
0.013% 
(21) 
Japan 
-0.433% 
(-4425) 
-0.010% 
(-105) 
-0.002% 
(-23) 
0.000% 
(0) 
0.000% 
(0) 
Canada 
-0.180% 
(-276) 
-0.004% 
(-6) 
-0.016% 
(-25) 
0.000% 
(0) 
0.000% 
(0) 
RAB 
-0.290% 
(-5915) 
-0.005% 
(-95) 
-0.002% 
(-40) 
0.000% 
(0) 
0.000% 
(0) 
 
Table 7: Percentage change in welfare (EV) and welfare loss in million USD (in 
brackets). “Foresight” case compared to baseline scenario 
 Non-compliance scenario 
Country FSU JAP CAN NOR HUN 
Norway 
-0.205 % 
(-76) 
-0.006 % 
(-2) 
-0.002 % 
(-1) 
-0.005 % 
(-2) 
0.000 % 
(0) 
Hungary 
0.284 % 
(30) 
0.005 % 
(1) 
0.002 % 
(0) 
0.000 % 
(0) 
-0.118 % 
(-13) 
FSU 
-1.272 % 
(-2174) 
0.052 % 
(88) 
0.022 % 
(38) 
0.002 % 
(3) 
0.007 % 
(12) 
Japan 
-0.145 % 
(-1483) 
-0.009 % 
(-90) 
-0.002 % 
(-16) 
0.000 % 
(0) 
0.000 % 
(0) 
Canada 
-0.118 % 
(-181) 
-0.004 % 
(-6) 
-0.016 % 
(-24) 
0.000 % 
(0) 
0.000 % 
(0) 
RAB 
-0.136 % 
(-2781) 
-0.004 % 
(-82) 
-0.002 % 
(-35) 
0.000 % 
(0) 
0.000 % 
(0) 
 
                                                     
20 Some of these gains occur in the time periods before the punishment takes place. This is an 
unfortunate effect of using an intertemporal model - as it allows for intertemporal substitution – a type 
of perfect foresight that is not well suited to this type of analysis.  
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These results largely hold true for the “foresight” case as well. However, there are some 
modifications. With foresight the permit price does not increase quite as much. Consequently, 
the welfare losses are smaller. In the case where Russia is punished, Norway experiences a 
welfare loss of “only” 0.205% in the “foresight” case. However, the component of the loss 
that can be attributed to Norway having to purchase additional permits, remains the same. 
Therefore Norway’s own non-compliance becomes relatively more costly compared to non-
compliance by other countries. For example, it is now more costly for Norway that Norway 
itself is punished than that Canada is punished. Notice, however, that in the “foresight” case 
too it is even more costly that Japan or Russia is punished. 
It is instructive to compare the effects for Norway with those for Hungary. Hungary differs 
from Norway in that it is a permit seller and a fossil fuel importer. Because of these two 
characteristics, the welfare effects for Hungary if another country is punished are markedly 
different from the welfare effects for Norway. While either country suffers if it is punished 
itself, in all other scenarios Hungary experiences a welfare gain while Norway experiences a 
loss. 
4 Conclusion  
To induce compliance, an international enforcement mechanism needs to authorize the use of 
punitive consequences against a non-compliant country. However, it is reasonable to require 
that such consequences do not cause considerable damage to other countries as well. The 
compliance mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol does not meet this standard. If the Enforcement 
Branch imposes punitive consequences, these consequences will not only have an impact on 
the non-compliant country. They will have considerable welfare effects on compliant 
countries too. We have shown that in the case of Norway, the adverse welfare effects can 
actually be worse if another country (such as Canada, Japan, or Russia) is punished than if 
Norway itself is punished. Similar effects are experienced by other buyers of emission 
permits as well. However, Norway suffers more than other buyers, because this country is 
also a major exporter of fossil fuels. 
Kyoto’s compliance mechanism does not automatically become legally binding if and when 
the Kyoto Protocol enters into force. To make it binding requires that the Meeting of the 
Parties approves an amendment to the treaty. In addition, such an amendment must be ratified 
by the member countries. The rather remarkable effects that have been demonstrated in this 
paper add to other weaknesses of the compliance mechanism which are well documented in 
the literature. Hence, member countries of the Kyoto Protocol might be well advised to think 
twice before they allow this mechanism to become operational. 
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Appendix: The DEEP model 
The DEEP model consists of five main elements: Production sectors, emissions trading, an 
Armington aggregation of domestic and imported goods, a capital and an investment sector, 
and a representative agent.  
The structure of production and demand has been adopted from the GTAP-EG model by 
Rutherford and Paltsev (2000) – with some modifications. Production is described using two 
different production functions, one for fossil fuel production, and one for non-fossil fuel 
production.  
Fossil fuel production is a CES-function that includes crude oil, gas and coal. Fossil fuels 
are produced as an aggregate of a resource and a non-resource input. Non-fossil fuel goods 
are produced with fixed-coefficient (Leontief) inputs of intermediate non-energy goods and 
an energy-primary factor composite.  
Emissions trading is assumed to be comprehensive (i.e. all sectors take part in emissions 
trading) and fully competitive. Emissions are modelled as a fixed share input of permits in 
both production and final demand (more technically it is implemented as a Leontief 
technology composite of fossil fuel inputs and permits).  
The regions are linked though bilateral trade flows. All goods, except the primary factors 
(labour and capital) and the investment good, can be traded among the regions. The model 
assumes that goods produced in different countries are not identical (the “Armington 
assumption”). The importing of goods taxes place in a separtate “Armington” sector. The 
elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported goods is 4, while the, while the 
elasticity of substitution among imports from different regions is 8. Each bilateral trade flow 
requires its own transportation service (with the exception of emission permits). This is 
modelled as a Leontief technology between the imported good and the transportation good. 
The transportation margins are proportional to quantities traded.  
The representative agent, which is both consumer and government, demands only the 
consumption good. This good is a constant elasticity aggregate of non-energy goods and 
energy goods. To pay for this good, the agent is endowed with labour and capital. The labour 
endowment grows for each year – at the same rate as the growth parameter, while capital is 
given as an initial capital stock. The representative agent collects all taxes and tariffs specified 
in the model. The agent is also endowed with emission permits – if the region is assumed to 
be taking part in a climate agreement. The agent uses the tax revenue and income from 
endowments to purchase the consumption good – or pay for investment. While the agent gets 
utility only from the consumption good, investment is driven by the returns to capital 
generated in the next perod, and a terminal capital constraint.  
The structures of the capital and investment sectors are straightforward. The capital sector 
converts the initial capital stock into returns to captial, and next-period capital stock. The 
return to capital is determined by the interest rate, while the next-period capital stock is equal 
to the initial capital stock less depreciation. Investment takes place through the production of 
an investment good (with the same production strcuture as other non-fossil fuel goods). The 
output from the investment is next-period capital stock.  
The model is an intertemporal model with a utility maximising representative agent. 
Investment (growth) is endogenous, but investment is not determined, as in many other 
models, through a time preference rate or savings rate. Instead the time preference rate is 
implied through an equilibrium growth parameter that defines a growth rate that is optimal for 
the original equilibrium (baseline). Investment (and thus growth) will vary between the 
scenarios as the representative agent seeks to maximise utility under the new conditions (the 
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intertemporal elasticity of substitution is 0.5). The equilibrium growth parameter is 
differentiated between regions and time periods.  
The economic data used in the DEEP model is the GTAP (v5) data base - which provides 
input-output data for each region, bilateral trade data, and information on taxes and tariffs. 
These taxes and tariffs are used in the DEEP model. The emissions data is from the 
GTAP/EPA Project “Towards an Integrated Data Base for Assessing the Potential for 
Greenhouse Gas Mitigation”. The growth and technological change parameters in the model 
are based on the IPCC SRES A1B scenario (Nakicenovic and Swart, 2000).21  
 
 
21 The SRES A1B scenario assumes “rapid and successful economic development”, where the global 
economy grows at an average annual rate of 3%, and where technological progress is rapid. 
